What Happened
A recent legislative proposal in Panama’s National Assembly would remove the Public Prosecutor’s (Ministerio Público) ability to appeal acquittal decisions handed down in first instance. Supporters of the piece argue for procedural limits, while opponents say the change would undermine due process and constitutional guarantees by preventing higher courts from correcting manifestly unlawful acquittals.
Legal context
Critics point to the Constitution and established jurisprudence to challenge the initiative. The article 17, second paragraph, of Panama’s Constitution and the doctrine of the so-called “block of constitutionality” integrate international human rights treaties into the constitutional order. The Supreme Court’s 21 August 2008 ruling (opinion by Magistrate Jerónimo Mejía) affirmed the binding nature of conventionality review. The opinion also cites Article 8.2(h) of the American Convention on Human Rights, which secures the right to appeal.
Panama’s Criminal Procedure Code (CPP) already provides a structure for review: Article 41 establishes competency for Superior Courts of Appeal; Article 163 limits review to points actually challenged (the grievances); and Article 168 authorizes the superior court to revoke, reform or confirm first-instance resolutions. Observers say removing the prosecutor’s appeal would break this balance and hinder effective judicial review.
Arguments and principles at stake
The debate centers on core principles of due process, equality of arms, and the fallibility of human adjudication. As the columnist notes, denying the prosecution the right to appeal an acquittal would create a zone in which potentially arbitrary or unsupported acquittals cannot be reviewed by a higher tribunal. International jurisprudence from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in cases such as Mohamed v. Argentina and Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, has emphasized that remedies must be ordinary, accessible and effective.
The piece also invokes scholarly work—referencing Luigi Ferrajoli’s observation that “the history of punishments is a history of horrors and the history of trials is a history of errors”—to underline why procedural safeguards and motivaciones in sentencing are essential to allow critical review.
What this means
If adopted, the proposal would limit one of the prosecution’s principal means to challenge acquittals and could shift the balance of the accusatory system by denying victims and society a channel to seek correction of judicial error. The columnist urges deputies to respect constitutional limits and international obligations, warning that legislating otherwise would be both a legal and political overreach.
The opinion piece concludes by reminding lawmakers that the right to impugn decisions is not a mere formality but a structural guarantee designed to reduce judicial error and protect individual and social rights.